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DOCTRINE OF INTRAFAMILY IMMUNITY

YoRK. - Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434,
245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
ABOLISHED IN NEW

Appellant brought a tort action against her unemancipated son
to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile
accident allegedly caused by his negligence. The affirmative defense of
intrafamily immunity was routinely raised in the lower courts and
upheld. The New York Court of Appeals, in reversing, unanimously
held that the defense of intrafamily immunity for nonwillful torts was
henceforth abolished.
The doctrine of intrafamily tort immunity abruptly assumed
its place in American jurisprudence at the close of the nineteenth
century. In Hewellette v. George,1 decided in 1891, the court denied
a cause of action to a young girl who had been maliciously confined
in an insane asylum by her mother. Citing no authority for its decision,
the Hewellette court established the rule that an unemancipated child
could not maintain a tort action against a parent.2 The court's rationale was focused upon several compelling public policy considerations
- the most important of which were the upheaval of domestic tranquillity and interference with parental control.3
Adhering primarily to the principles established in Hewellette,
two subsequent cases authoritatively sustained and firmly established
intrafamily immunity in situations which exemplified the initial harshness of the rule. McKelvey v. McKelvey4 involved cruel and inhuman
168 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
2 Authorities are in conflict as to the existence of such a cause of action in tort at early
common law (though there is some dictum to support the position), since no early English
cases dealt directly with the subject. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic
Relation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1059-63 (1930). Several courts have contended that the
lack of cases connotes the existence of the immunity rule at common law. See, e.g., Matarese
v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905);
McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903). Others have expressed the
opinion that this paucity of case-law suggests that there was never a common law rule that
a child could not sue his parents. See, e.g., Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147
(1960) (dissenting opinion); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Dunlap
v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927)
(dissenting opinion).
3 Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891).
Traditional justifications for the immunity are: (1) the protection of domestic tranquillity; (2) the protection of parental rights and obligations; (3) the similarity to suits
between spouses, which were prohibited at common law; (4) the analogy of parents to
the historically immune sovereign; (5) the possible succession to the judgment award by
the parent; (6) the danger of denying other family members their share of the family
resources; and (7) the danger of fraud in suits between parent and child. See Comment,
1938 Wis. L. REv. 176, 177-78; McCurdy, supra note 2, at 1072-77.
4 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
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treatment of a child, while Roller v. Roller 5 reiterated the application
of the rule to a willful tort. Both cases asserted the preeminence of
family serenity and parental discipline over the common law ideal
that for every wrong there should be a remedy. With these early cases
as precedent, the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity proliferated
and became widely accepted. 6
In New York, the inquiry into the immunity doctrine was initiated in Ciani v. Ciani,7 a lower court decision in which a child was
injured in an automobile accident caused by his father's negligence.
In denying recovery, the court emphasized the sine qua non of family
unity, and the traditional prohibition (according to the court) of such
an action at common law. Two years later, the New York Court of
Appeals, in Sorrentino v. Sorrentino,8 formally adopted the principle
of intrafamily immunity, thus prohibiting child-parent suits for nonwillful torts.9 However, dissents by Chief Judge Cardozo and Judges
Andrews and Crane indicated that early apprehensions surrounded
the profundity of the doctrine. 10
Since Sorrentino, the absurdity of blind adherence to the immunity principle and the apparent injustice of the doctrine itself have
contributed to its gradual erosion in New York and other states." The
intrinsic rationale for parental immunitythat a parent should not
be liable for torts ascribed to parental responsibilities -soon
gave
rise to exceptions emanating from actions not associated with such
responsibilities, or which indicated that the parent had temporarily
abandoned his parental role.12 For instance, in Cannon v. Cannon,13
an action was brought by an unemancipated minor against his father
and the estate of his deceased mother to recover damages for personal
injuries suffered in an accident caused by the mother's negligent operation of the father's automobile. The unanimous New York Court of
Appeals decision, while stressing the integral role of the family in Amer5 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
6 See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 10 (Alas. 1967). See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423,
439-42 (1951).
7 127 Misc. 304, 215 N.Y.S. 767 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1926).
8 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928).
9 Although Sorrentino stated that a minor child could not sue a parent, the converse
was never declared to be the law of the state. However, there is dictum to that effect in
Lo Galbo v. Lo Galbo, 138 Misc. 485, 487, 246 N.Y.S. 565, 567 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County
1930). See also Boehm v. C.M. Gridley & Sons, 187 Misc. 113, 114, 63 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1946).
10 Comment, 1938 Wis. L. R v. 176, 178 & n.20.
11 McCurdy, supra note 2, at 1069-71. See generally Akers & Drummond, Tort Actions
Between Members of the Family, 26 Mo. L. REav. 152 (1961).
12 Comment, 1938 Wis. L. Rtv. 176, 178-81.
13 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942).
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ican society, noted that recognition of the action would expose parents
to a deluge of suits. Significantly, however, the Court stated that "[i]n
the absence of statutory sanction, we are not prepared, in cases where
wilful misconduct by the parent is not a factor, to inject the disruptive
risk of tort liability between parents and their unemancipated children .... -14 Analysis of this statement reveals the Court's advocacy of an exception to the general immunity principle: parental
liability for willful or malicious torts inflicted upon a child. Subsequent New York cases have sustained this concept of parental liability
on the basis that one who acts in this manner is not behaving as a
reasonable parent, and thus is not immune' 5
Another prominent exception to the ordinary rule pertained to
an emancipated minor's right to maintain a cause of action. In New
York, it was established that an emancipated child could both sue1O and
be sued by his parents'17 for tortious acts. The courts have viewed the
advent of emancipation as a spontaneous decimation of family unity
the core of the immunity doctrine. Further exceptions to the doctrine developed from situations in which the parent was engaged in
his business or occupation at the time of the negligent act. In the
landmark case, Dunlap v. Dunlap,8 an injury to the plaintiff child
resulted from negligence for which the defendant, his father, was liable. Since the relationship was actually one of employer-employee,
9
rather than that of father-son, the court granted recovery.'
The last major exception to develop concerned a somewhat more
complicated situation - that in which a child sued a third party who
was liable for the negligence of, but entitled to indemnification by,
at 429, 40 N.E2d at 238 (dictum) (emphasis added).
Harbin v. Harbin, 218 N.Y.S.2d 808 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), aff'd, 16 App. Div. 2d
696, 227 N.YS.2d 1023 (2d Dep't 1961); Siembab v. Siembab, 284 App. Div. 652, 134 N.Y.S.2d
437 (4th Dep't 1954); Henderson v. Henderson, 11 Misc. 2d 449, 169 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1957).
16 Crosby v. Crosby, 230 App. Div. 651, 246 N.Y.S. 384 (3d Dep't 1930) (question of
fact presented as to whether child was emancipated); Murphy v. Murphy, 206 Misc. 228,
133 N.YS.2d 796 (Sup. Ct. Madison County 1954) (reported as Broome County in N.Y.S.2d).
17 Lo Galbo v. Lo Galbo, 138 Misc. 485, 246 N.Y.S. 565 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County
1930). Curiously, New York, as early as 1892, recognized the right of a child to sue his
parents in conjunction with a contract or property action. Ulrich v. Ulrich, 136 N.Y. 120,
32 N.E. 606 (1892) (son's suit against mother's estate for services rendered). See also Lamb v.
Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895); Becker v. Rieck, 19 Misc. 2d 104, 188 N.Y.S.2d 724
(Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1959). In giving effect to this exception, policy considerations
denying tort liability have been traditionally disregarded as domestic tranquillity has not
been considered controlling. See supra note 3.
18 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
19 This exception has found wide acceptance in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Signs v.
Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d
149 (1952); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17,
166 S.E. 538 (1932).
14 Id.
'5
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the parent. Such an indirect action was permitted in Kemp v. Rockland Leasing, Inc., 20 wherein an unemancipated infant was awarded

damages for injuries sustained while a passenger in the defendant's
car which had been operated by the plaintiff's mother in a negligent
manner. Defendant's liability was based upon the New York Vehicle
and Traffic Law, 21 which in no way prohibits the securing of indemnification from a negligent driver.
With the foregoing exceptions firmly entrenched, the New York
Court of Appeals once again encountered the question of intrafamily
immunity in Badigian v. Badigian,22 a negligence action brought by
the plaintiff's mother, on behalf of the child, against the defendant
father. The father had left the family car unlocked in a parking lot
and the child, releasing the brake, was subsequently injured while
jumping from the rolling vehicle. The Court, in sustaining immunity,
stated that only legislative action could reverse the rule and allow
suits of this particular nature.2 3 Of far greater consequence was the
foreboding dissent of Judge Fuld. Vehemently denouncing the reasons
set forth for allowing immunity, 24 he emphasized that there was no
vindication for protecting conceded wrongdoing. Stressing that "the
broad and numerous qualifications and exceptions to the family immunity doctrine have almost swallowed the rule", 25 the dissent pragmatically noted the presence of insurance as the compelling factor for
acquiescence to the suit.
The rigid conceptualism of Badigian generated pervasive judicial
hostility. With an expanding animosity towards the immunity rule
predicated upon the wide prevalence of liability insurance, 26 courts
slowly abandoned the only true vestige of the doctrine. 27
Against this background, plaintiff in the instant case 28 brought a
tort action against the defendant, her unemancipated son, to recover
2051 Misc. 2d 1073, 274 N.Y.S.2d 952 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966). See also Winnick
v. Kupperman Constr. Co., 29 App. Div. 2d 261, 287 N.Y.S.2d 329 (2d Dep't 1968).
21 N.Y. VEH. & Tsts. LAW § 388 (McKinney 1960):

Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and responsible
for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or
operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person
using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.
22 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961).
23 Id. at 474, 174 N.E.2d at 719, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
24 9 N.Y.2d 472, 475-76, 174 N.E.2d 718, 720-21, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 38-39 (dissenting
opinion).
25 Id. at 478, 174 N.E.2d at 722, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
26 See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967); Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163
A.2d 147 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
27 See Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H.
432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
28 Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
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for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident allegedly
caused by his negligence. The trial court and the appellate division
unanimously sustained the affirmative defense of intrafamily immunity
raised by the son's insurance company. 29 In the Court of Appeals, however, the doctrine floundered. Writing for a unanimous Court, Judge
Burke lucidly expounded a number of cogent reasons for abrogating
the immunity rule. He assailed the Badigian decision for categorically
stating that any modification of the immunity principle would have
to be implemented by the legislature. Moreover, due to the inactivity
of the legislature since Badigian, the Court felt compelled to revoke
what was, after all, a court-created rule.
Also paramount in the Court's rationale was the multitude of exceptions which had been carved out of the immunity doctrine. Relying
primarily upon Judge Fuld's vigorous. dissent in Badigian, the Court
expressed the opinion that the incongruous exceptions "neither permit reconciliation with the family immunity doctrine, nor provide
a meaningful pattern of departure from the rule. Rather, they attest
the primitive nature of the rule and require its repudiation."3 0 Furthermore, the gradual abandonment of the immunity principle by
other jurisdictions persuaded the Court to specifically overrule Sorrentino, Cannon and Badigian, since the original policy considerations
underlying the doctrine, although viable, were no longer pertinent to
the effectuation of family harmony. Those considerations, predicated
upon a continuum of family unity, could not be promoted by a mere
categorical refusal to allow such suits. On the contrary, family unity
could only be preserved by allowing the action in this case.31
Perhaps the most influential motive for the Court's decision was
the existence of compulsory automobile insurance in New York. Since
most contemporary intrafamily cases are "impregnated with liability
insurance," 32 the Court calculated that the raison d'etre for immunity
- continued family harmony - while relevant,3 3 would be promoted
rather than inhibited by such actions.
Gelbman presents a most interesting question for consideration:
has the New York Court of Appeals categorically abolished the doctrine of intrafamily immunity, or has it merely created a further ex29 52 Misc. 2d 412, 275 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1966), aff'd, 28 App.
Div. 2d 826, 282 N.Y.S.2d 670 (2d Dep't 1967) (no opinion).
30 23 N.Y.2d at 438, 245 N.E2d at 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
31 Id.
32 Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 76 (Mo. 1960) (negligence action by unemancipated minor allowed against deceased mother's estate) (dissenting opinion).
33 23 N.Y.2d at 438, 245 N.E2d at 194, 297 N.YS.2d at 532.
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ception to the rule by rendering the doctrine inapplicable where automobile liability insurance is involved? If, as it appears on the face of
the opinion, total abrogation is the intention of the Court, the Gelbman decision is not only without precedent in this jurisdiction, but is
at variance with the public policy of virtually every other American
jurisdiction as well. 34
While there have been attacks upon the doctrine in several states,
the arguments advanced in each have been quite similar. Invariably,
the vehicle utilized for the assault upon the intrafamily immunity doctrine has been the automobile accident. 35 A salient contention of each
opponent of the doctrine has been the nullifying effect of liability
insurance upon the domestic tranquillity theory of the immunity doctrine. It has been contended, and rightfully so, that where an insurer is
the true defendant in a child-parent suit, the allowance of the suit is
not inconsistent with the maintenance of familial concord.36 Relying
upon these accident cases, a few states have purported to abolish the
doctrine, while at the same time setting forth exceptions to any such
abrogation. In Goller v. White,37 for example, a Wisconsin court abolished immunity with the following qualifications: the doctrine would
still constitute a bar (1) where the alleged negligent act involved an
exercise of parental authority over the child, or (2) where the alleged
negligent act involved an exercise of parental discretion with respect
to the provision of food, clothing, housing and other care.3 This holding clearly indicates that while there may be a trend towards further
limitation of the immunity doctrine where liability insurance is available to prevent family discord,3 9 there is no unqualified willingness to
34 Though there have been attacks on the doctrine in a few states, see supra notes
26 & 27, New Hampshire is the only jurisdiction which thus far has not recognized exceptions in its treatment. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966.) However, since
Briere also was an automobile accident case in which liability insurance was involved, its
substantive ruling, like Gelbman's, would appear to warrant confirmation or, as seems more
likely, limitation.
35 See, e.g., Silesky v. Kelman, 161 N.W.2d 631 (Minn. 1968) and cases supra, notes
29 & 30.
36 Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963) citing 1 HARPER & JAmEs,
LAW OF TORTS § 8.11, at 649 (1956); McCurdy, Torts Between Parentand Child, 5 V.
L.
R1v. 521, 546 (1960); Note, Parent-Child Tort Liability and Compulsory Insurance, 33
ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 310, 311 (1959).
37 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963); accord, Silesky v. Kelman, 161 N.W.2d
631 (Minn. 1968).
38 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198. The limitation of the Wisconsin pronouncement in Goller is dearly expressed in Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341
(1968), where a parent was not held liable for an injury to his child, which was allegedly
the result of the parent's failure to teach the child how to cross the street. Such a failure,
the court concluded, arose from the still-privileged exercise of parental discretion.
39 Compare Purcell v. Frazer, 7 Ariz. App. 5, 435 P.2d 736 (1967), where the court
refused to abolish the immunity doctrine, specifically noting a lack of compulsory liability
insurance.
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allow causes of action to unemancipated minor children for injuries
arising out of functions purely parental in nature.
The New York immunity doctrine has faced the same challenge
in a number of accident cases. 40 In Badigian,wherein the doctrine was
reaffirmed, Judge Fuld's vigorous dissent foreshadowed the position
later taken by the Wisconsin court in Goller; though he called for the
demise of the immunity doctrine, he excluded from his proposed abrogation those causes of action which might arise in the course of daily
family living.41 In relying upon the insurance argument, Judge Fuld
contended that "the doctrine of family immunity... at least when
applied to deny redress in automobile negligence cases, is wrong in
principle and at odds with justice and modern-day realities. ' 42 The
Gelbman opinion, allegedly based upon the Fuld dissent,43 neglected
to mention Judge Fuld's express exclusions, and instead purported
to unconditionally abolish "the defense of intrafamily tort immunity for nonwillful torts ... .,,44 In so doing, the Court utilized the
very theory upon which the immunity doctrine rests-the protection of family unity. After quoting a single law review article out of
context,45 the Court concluded that in this particularcase family unity
required the maintenance of the suit (for disciplinary purposes), and
as a prerequisite to such suit the Court felt compelled to overturn the
immunity doctrine.
This reasoning on the part of the Court leaves in doubt the perplexing question raised above. Does Gelbman represent total abrogation of the immunity doctrine, or merely another exception? Since
the manifest intent of the Gelbman court was the continued protection of family unity, and since it rested its case for abrogation upon
the existence of liability insurance, it seems proper to assume that in
the future, when there arises a non-automobile case in which insur40 Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961); Cannon
v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162
N.E. 551 (1928).
419 N.Y.2d 472, 480-81, 174 NXE.2d 718, 728-24, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 42 (1961) (dissenting
opinion).
42 Id. at 474-75, 174 N.E2d at 720, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 37 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis
added).
43 In basing his opinion on Judge Fuld's dissent in Badigian, Judge Burke said,
"Rather than repeat the convincing arguments advanced by Judge Fuld .. .I would
merely summarize the many points advanced therein for the abolition of the immunity
rule." 23 N.Y.2d at 487-88, 245 N.E2d at 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
44 28 N.Y.2d at 439, 245 NX.2d at 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 582.

45 The commentator in Note, Parent-Child Tort Liability and Compulsory Insurance,

88 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 810, 319 (1959), suggests that if a suit by a parent against a child is
viewed as a disciplinary action it would then be a "proper disturbance of family harmony."
The Court interpreted this as requiring such suits to preserve family harmony.
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ance is not involved, and which therefore presents a danger to domestic tranquillity, the Court will be compelled, at the very least, to limit
Gelbman to its facts, as an Alaskan court did under similar facts and
circumstances in Hebel v. Hebel.48
A suggestion has been made which might further alleviate the apparent inequities of the doctrine, yet, at the same time, protect the
family unit from unnecessary litigation. Since a minor child's injuries,
if limited to the period of minority, cause him no pecuniary loss,47 the
only real inequity exists when the injury extends into the child's majority. Chief Judge Desmond, in the Badigian majority opinion, suggested that "[p]erhaps some other special provision should be made for
cases where disability extends beyond infancy .... ,"48 Such a provision
apparently exists: the Gelbman court recognized that Section 208
of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules [hereinafter CPLR]
"would seem to protect the right of the child to maintain the action
upon reaching majority." 49 Since the doctrine of intrafamily immunity is a court-initiated doctrine, 50 it may be utilized by the Court to
effect the desired ends of justice. The Court may, if it wishes, view
CPLR section 208 as allowing a child to sue its parents for injuries
caused during minority where the disability extends into majority.
Such a course would remedy any serious injuries to a child, and at the
same time, protect the family unit from suits of dubious merit.
The extent to which the intrafamily immunity doctrine may still
function will be determined only by future litigation. In any event,
the Court must now be willing to either affirm its Gelbman position
in all manner of cases, or else choose a more limiting conclusion within
the clearly desirable remnants of the family immunity doctrine, as
espoused by the Goller court.
46 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967). Since the factor of insurance could not be made a part of a
plaintiff's prima fade case, in order for Gelbman to operate effectively as precedent, any
limitation of Gelbman would have to be expressed simply as excepting suits by (or against)
minors which arise from automobile accidents.
47 McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HAuv. L. R-v. 1030, 1078
(1930).
48 9 N.Y.2d at 474, 174 N.E.2d at 719, 215 N.Y.$.2d at 87.
49 23 N.Y.2d at 438, 245 N.E.2d at 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 581. No supporting authority
was cited. The New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 208 (McKinney 1963) reads, in
part:
If a person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrues,
under the age of twenty-one years.. . and the time otherwise limited for commencing
the action is three years or more and expires no later than three years after the disability ceases . . . the time within which the action must be commenced shall be
extended to three years after the disability ceases . . . ; if the time otherwise limited
is less than three years, the time shall be extended by the period of disability.
50 23 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530.

